Christopher Finck: Unabhängige Bankenaufsicht, Gebunden

Blurb

With the introduction of the "Single Supervisory Mechanism" (SSM) as part of the European Banking Union, key tasks of banking supervision were transferred, by way of Union law, to an independent exercise within an administrative network composed of the European Central Bank and national supervisory authorities. From the perspective of German constitutional law, the independent performance of administrative functions is often regarded with considerable skepticism and - as in the case of central banking - considered permissible only in narrowly defined exceptional circumstances. In light of the requirements of democratic legitimacy and mutual checks and balances, such independence is seen as particularly in need of justification. Against this background, Christopher Finck examines the primary law and constitutional parameters governing the independent exercise of banking supervisory tasks, taking into account the constellation reflected in the SSM, in which these tasks are carried out jointly with central bank functions by a single institution. Drawing on extrajuridical insights, particularly from economics, he first analyzes the reasons for and effects of granting independence. He then assesses whether, and in what form, supervisory independence within the SSM can be reconciled with the requirements of EU primary law and national constitutional law. He identifies possible organizational structures that satisfy these legal requirements while enabling the effective performance of supervisory functions.