Akira Okada: Games and Coalitions, Gebunden

Klappentext

Coalition formation is an important problem in economics, politics, and a broad range of other social situations. Examples of coalitions range from those at the level of individuals (families, couples, teams, employers, workers) through to those at the level of organisations and countries (political parties, free trade agreements, environmental agreements, military alliances). Traditionally, game theory has been divided into non-cooperative and cooperative games. The former approach scrutinizes individuals' rational behaviour under a well-specified process of a game. The latter presents various cooperative solutions based on collective rationality. Games and Coalitions draws on both approaches, providing a bridge between cooperative and non-cooperative analyses of coalition formation. Offering a useful research monograph regarding the models, results and applications of non-cooperative coalitional bargaining theory, this book illustrates how game theory applies to various economic and political problems, including resource allocation, public goods, wage bargaining, legislative bargaining, and climate cooperation.