Ulrich Schwalbe: The Core of Economies with Asymmetric Information, Kartoniert / Broschiert

Inhaltsangabe

Introduction - Information in Models of General Equilibrium.- Information as a Commodity.- Information as a Characteristic of an Agent.- Organization of the Analysis.- Survey of the Literature.- The Information of the Agents.- Commodities, Consumption Sets, and Initial Endowments.- Preferences.- The Impact of Information on Consumption Plans.- Information of the Agents as Coalition Members.- Feasible Allocations.- The Blocking of an Allocation by a Coalition.- Incentive Compatibility.- Definitions of the Core.- Existence of Core Allocations.- Properties of Core Allocations.- Replica Theorems and Large Economies.- Exchange Economies.- Exchange Economies with Asymmetric Information.- An Exchange Economy with Information Rule.- The Game Generated by an Exchange Economy with Information Rule.- Extensions: Incentives, Sequential Trade, and Learning.- Conclusion.- Production Economies.- Coalition Production Economies with Asymmetric Information.- Feasible Allocations.- The Core of a Production Economy with Asymmetric Information.- The Cooperative Game Generated by a Production Economy.- Balanced Technologies and the Existence of Core Allocations.- Costs of Coalition Formation.- Summary and Discussion. Conclusion.

Klappentext

and should therefore constitute a part of every area of economic 3 theory. The spectrum covered by information economics today ranges from Stigler's search theory4 to industrial economics, including oligopoly theory, innovation, as well as research and develop­ 5 ment. However, the area information economics is most closely connected with is the theory of optimal contracts, mainly ana­ 6 lyzed in principal-agent models. Contract theory deals primar­ ily with the question of how optimal arrangements (contracts) for the purchase and sale of commodities and services between two or more agents should be structured. In these models, it is often assumed that the parties to the contract are informed differently or asymmetrically about relevant variables (e. g. the health of one party in the case of insurance contracts, or the effort in relation to employment contracts). As a result of this asymmetric in­ formation, phenomena such as moral hazard, adverse selection, signaling, and screening may arise. Frequently, results from con­ tract theory are referred to when making statements about the effects of asymmetric information on an economy. Models of this kind are often used to explain phenomena such as fixed wages or unemployment, among others. 7 However, such conclusions must be treated with caution for two reasons. In the first place, in these models, a contract (explicit or implicit) is determined by the solution of an optimization prob­ lem.