Non-Expected Utility and Risk Management
Inhaltsangabe
Editor' Note. Introductory Note; C. Gollier. Non-Expected Utility and the Robustness of the Classical Insurance Paradigm; M. J. Machina. Non-Expected Utility and the Robustness of the Classical Insurance Paradigm: Discussion; E. Karni. The Comparative Statics of Deductible Insurance in Expected and Non-expected Utility Theories; E. E. Schlee. Risk Aversion Concepts in Expected and Non- expected Utility Models; M. Cohen. Government Action, Biases in Risk Perception, and Insurance Decisions; W. K. Viscusi. A Comparison of the Estimates of EU and non-EU Preference Functionals Using Data from Pairwise Choice and Complete Ranking Experiments; E. Carbone, J. D. Hey. Functional Form Problems in Modelling Insurance and Gambling; W. E. Diewert.
Klappentext
Expected utility provides simple, testable properties of the optimum behavior that should be displayed by risk-averse individuals in risky decisions. Simultaneously, given the existence of paradoxes under the expected utility paradigm, expected utility can only be regarded as an approximation of actual behavior. A more realistic model is needed. This is particularly true when treating attitudes toward small probability events: the standard situation for insurable risks. Non-Expected Utility and Risk Management examines whether the existing results in insurance economics are robust to more general models of behavior under risk.
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